In this thesis I will argue that it is irrational to anticipate the future. I do not claim that the future will not exist, but rather that our current selves will never experience that future. Support for this seemingly implausible thesis begins when consider the problems posed by personal identity puzzle cases. When we consider hypothetical cases such as fission, where one existing person will divide into two future people (for example through brain transplants or teletransportation), we instinctively wonder which of the two post-fission bodies the pre-fission person would 'wake up' in. Could it be the case that our subject of experience does not in fact 'go' anywhere? I initially consider the interdependency between personal identity and the displacement of our current selves into the past or future. Ultimately, I will argue that self displacement is not based on personal identity, but rather the reverse that is, that personal identity is based on our hard-wired tendency to displace our current selves into the past or future. I then present the crux of my argument, that it is irrational to anticipate the future. I will do this by presenting cases in which it is clearly irrational to anticipate 'waking up' in a certain body and demonstrating that these cases are comparable to 'waking up' in the same physically or psychologically continuous body. Contrary to our most deeply held beliefs, it is not rational to expect that our present subject of experience will somehow be there in the future. This astonishing conclusion removes our most obvious reason for concern about future selves. I will argue that if this conclusion is correct, we have relatively weak reasons for prudential concern about the future. One of the key objectives of this thesis will therefore be to determine whether it is rational for our current self to be concerned about a future self that it will never experience being. I will show that if we are irrational to anticipate the future, then we must radically rethink the sort of prudential concern we have for our future selves. I argue that our reasons to be concerned about future selves are much weaker than (or at least very different than) those we might have originally imagined. I will also show that it is not against reason to be unconcerned about future selves, unless we believe that we are morally obliged to be concerned for all future people.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:ADTP/178572 |
| Date | January 2007 |
| Creators | Pickering, Phillip |
| Publisher | University of Western Australia. School of Humanities, University of Western Australia. Philosophy Discipline Group |
| Source Sets | Australiasian Digital Theses Program |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Rights | Copyright Phillip Pickering, http://www.itpo.uwa.edu.au/UWA-Computer-And-Software-Use-Regulations.html |
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