Abstract
In this research report, the author defends Peter van Inwagen’s modal
skepticism. Van Inwagen accepts that we have much basic, everyday modal
knowledge, but denies that we have the capacity to justify philosophically interesting
modal claims that are far removed from this basic knowledge. The
author also defends the argument by means of which van Inwagen supports
his modal skepticism. Van Inwagen argues that Stephen Yablo’s recent and
influential account of the relationship between conceivability and possibility
supports his skeptical claims. The author’s defence involves a creative interpretation
and development of Yablo’s account, which results in a recursive
account of modal epistemology, what the author calls the “safe explanation”
model of modal epistemology. The defence of van Inwagen’s argument also
involves a rebuttal to objections offered to van Inwagen by Geirrson and
Sosa.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:wits/oai:wiredspace.wits.ac.za:10539/6082 |
| Date | 12 February 2009 |
| Creators | Hawke, Peter |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | application/pdf, application/pdf |
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