The market conditions in the banking sector, the corporate governance structure of banks, and the financial accounting practices have been highlighted among the key causes of the global financial crisis of 2007-2010. In this thesis, I analyse the ‘dark side' of competition by casting the spotlight on the relationship between competition, corporate governance, financial stability, and financial misreporting. I also bring corporate governance into the fray by analysing its link to financial misreporting. Probing the interplay between banking sector competition, corporate governance, financial stability and financial misreporting provides a fantastic setting to tap into and provide unique insights across the accounting, banking and finance domains. In putting together this piece of work, I extracted data from sources including Bankscope, Compustat, SEC enforcement releases and the World Bank Doing Business survey among others. In the 1st chapter, I regress financial stability proxies against various competition/concentration proxies using the GMM estimator with an instrumental variable technique to address potential endogeneity. In the 2nd chapter I use difference-in-difference analysis to analyse how changes in the competitive landscape in the US financial services industry instigated by the financial crisis as an exogenous factor led to an increase in misreporting incidences. The 4th chapter is an evaluation of how five corporate governance dimensions impacted on financial misreporting in US commercial banks subject to SEC enforcement actions from 2000 to 2016. I uncover strong evidence to support the competition-fragility view, without yet being able to disprove the competition-stability view. My results suggest that greater banking competition yields riskier loan portfolios, but this increased risk is more than offset by banks holding higher capital and liquidity thresholds. I also study the link between competition and incidences of financial misreporting in the US financial services industry and the results suggest a significantly positive association between competition and financial misreporting. Furthermore, there is evidence that an exogenous increase in competition because of the financial crisis also fuelled financial misreporting incidences in the financial services industry. I then investigate the impact of corporate governance on financial misreporting in US commercial banks subject to SEC enforcement actions. My results are mixed across the five corporate governance dimensions utilised for this study. Consistent with the ‘agency cost' hypothesis, I find a negative association between board size and financial misreporting, yet CEO power asserts a positive association with financial misreporting in violation of both the ‘stewardship' and ‘entrenchment' hypotheses. The equity-based portion of executive compensation is negatively related with misreporting, whereas there is a positive association between the cash-based portion and misreporting. My research not only contributes to literature on competition, market power, bank risk, financial stability, corporate governance, and financial misreporting; but also provide several practical and theoretical implications for regulators, academics, governments and policymakers on the effective and efficient regulation of the governance and competitive landscapes in financial services. I specifically shine the spotlight on emerging literature on the pervasive effects (dark side) of competition from a purely financial services perspective and within the context of the global financial crisis of 2007-2010.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:751907 |
| Date | January 2018 |
| Creators | Mabvira, Lazarus Tapuwa |
| Publisher | University of Sussex |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/78217/ |
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