<p>This
dissertation argues for a number of theses related to responsibility, norm
psychology, and personhood. Although most of the papers argue for “standalone”
theses, in the sense that their truth does not depend the truth of the others,
the five papers collectively illustrate a broader view of humans as (a)
responsible agents who are (b) self-governing and (c) equipped with a capacity
for norms, and whose agency (d) centers on dynamic responsiveness to corrective
feedback. Drawing on this broader picture, the dissertation sheds light on
ethical questions about our social practices and technologies, as well as
descriptive questions about the nature of substance use disorder. </p>
<p>Most
centrally, the dissertation argues that forward-looking considerations are
relevant for responsibility, not merely because the consequences of our
responsibility practices are desirable, but primarily because of a connection
which I argue exists between relationships, norms, and learning. On the view I
defend, an agent is a responsible agent only if she can learn from being held
responsible, so as to regulate herself according to norms of which she
presently falls short. I argue that, if it were not for the capacity of humans
to learn from <i>social corrective feedback</i>,
such as normative responses like praise and blame, humans would be unable to
participate in norm-governed relationships and communities. It is in virtue of
their participation in these relationships and communities that humans are
subject to interpersonal norms, such that they can fulfill or violate these
norms and be praiseworthy or blameworthy for doing so. So, without the kind of
learning that makes participation in these relationships a possibility, humans
could never be praiseworthy or blameworthy for anything that they do. </p>
<p>The
dissertation also argues that human norm psychology has implications for how we
should relate to “social robots”—artificial agents designed to participate in
relationships with humans. I argue that, like humans, social robots should be
equipped with a capacity to recognize and respond to normative feedback. Lastly,
the dissertation resists a common narrative about addiction as being a form of
akrasia in which agents act against their own better judgment. While this is
certainly a central aspect of many cases of addiction, I argue that it fails to
appreciate the ways in which addiction sometimes interacts with a person’s
identity and goals, especially in cases where the agent believes that the
things she values would not be feasible if she did not continue to engage in
addictive behavior.</p>
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:purdue.edu/oai:figshare.com:article/15070290 |
| Date | 28 July 2021 |
| Creators | Stephen A Setman (11199060) |
| Source Sets | Purdue University |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, Thesis |
| Rights | CC BY 4.0 |
| Relation | https://figshare.com/articles/thesis/Learning_Responsibly_Essays_on_Responsibility_Norm_Psychology_and_Personhood/15070290 |
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