This thesis will explain in detail two closely related but jointly defensible moral realist positions. I show how each position responds to the initial dilemma of whether moral judgments are propositions. Following this discussion, I defend this combined position against an objection that the position is inherently contradictory. I conclude that one can coherently maintain both positions without a contradiction.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:GEORGIA/oai:digitalarchive.gsu.edu:philosophy_theses-1008 |
| Date | 31 July 2006 |
| Creators | Lesandrini, Jason |
| Publisher | Digital Archive @ GSU |
| Source Sets | Georgia State University |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | Philosophy Theses |
Page generated in 0.002 seconds