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An Econometric Analysis of Auction Price Results of the Shanghai Car License Plate from 2004 to 2018

This paper studies the effects of auction mechanisms on the average price of auction results of Shanghai car license plate from 2004 to 2018. We construct two linear regression models and find that an iterated multi-unit auction has a lower efficiency than a seal-bid discriminatory multi-unit auction. We also find that the pre-set price-ceiling is positively correlated with the average winning price. These results suggest that the government can potentially manipulate auction results through the design of the auction mechanism, and through the setting of warning price as a price ceiling.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:CLAREMONT/oai:scholarship.claremont.edu:cmc_theses-3237
Date01 January 2019
CreatorsJiang, Jinyi
PublisherScholarship @ Claremont
Source SetsClaremont Colleges
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
Formatapplication/pdf
SourceCMC Senior Theses
Rights© 2019 Jinyi Jiang, default

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