Return to search

Revenue Incentives and Referee Propensity to Make Foul Calls in the NBA Finals

In this study I examine foul calls by NBA referees alongside the difference in aggressiveness of twelve NBA basketball teams as they compete for the Championship Title. I aim to identify referee biases that increase the likelihood of the NBA Finals ending in a later game due to league revenue incentives. My data consists of 91 individual NBA Finals games played between the 2001 and 2016 NBA Finals. After controlling for changes in play as well as the difference in aggressiveness, I find that NBA referee’s foul calls are more dependent on a call on the opposing team in situations with a larger series score spread. Additionally, I identify a consistent officiating bias towards the home team. My results imply an effort by the NBA to increase the probability of the series ending in a later game, possibly motivated by increased revenues for the league and all parties involved.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:CLAREMONT/oai:scholarship.claremont.edu:cmc_theses-2733
Date01 January 2017
CreatorsFallon-Cyr, Daniel
PublisherScholarship @ Claremont
Source SetsClaremont Colleges
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
Formatapplication/pdf
SourceCMC Senior Theses
Rights© 2017 Daniel R Fallon-Cyr

Page generated in 0.0018 seconds