A distinction between ruminative and reflective forms of dispositional self-focus is introduced and the theoretical utility of this distinction is evaluated in a program
of eight studies. Study 1 examined for the presence of this distinction among
natural language trait descriptors. Study 2 evaluated whether this distinction
provided a sufficient summary of relations between the Fenigstein, Scheier and
Buss (1975) Self-Consciousness scales and the Five Factor Model of personality
(FFM). In Study 3, two brief questionnaire measures of ruminative and reflective
tendencies were developed, and their convergent and discriminant validity
evaluated with respect to the FFM, and the Fenigstein et al. (1975) Public Self-
Consciousness (PUSC) and Private Self-Consciousness (PRSC) scales. Study 4
investigated the extent to which rumination and reflection separately account for
PRSC associations with measures of psychological distress (e.g., Beck
Depression scale) and intellective dispositions (e.g., Need for Cognition scale), respectively. Study 5 evaluated, using a sample of dormitory roommates, the
extent to which self-estimates of ruminativeness and reflectiveness correspond
with the judgments of a knowledgeable observer. Studies 6, 7, and 8 evaluated
the extent to which the traits of rumination and reflection separately account for
previously reported PRSC associations with three theoretically relevant criteria of
private self-consciousness: state indices of self-focused attention (Study 6), the
asymmetry effect in self-other similarity judgments (Study 7), and research
volunteerism (Study 8). Findings suggest that the PRSC scale confounds two
relatively independent, and motivationally distinct dispositions, rumination and
reflection, and that latent ruminative and reflective components of PRSC scores
separately and fully account for PRSC correlates and effects. These findings
provide a straight forward explanation of the "self-absorption" paradox implicit in
the PRSC research literature, i.e., the consistent but apparently contradictory
finding of more accurate and extensive self-knowledge, yet higher levels of
subjective psychological distress, among persons high in private self-consciousness. It is likely that the PRSC's associations with psychological distress are uniquely due to its neurotic component (rumination), and that the PRSC's self-knowledge effects are uniquely due its intellective component
(reflection). It is argued that rumination and reflection represent statistically and
functionally independent self-focusing tendencies. Their strong and unique
associations with the FFM dimensions of neuroticism and openness, respectively, imply a basic dichotomy of self-attentive motives: anxiety/fear and curiosity/exploration: rumination represents a useful summary conception of self-attentiveness motivated by perceived threats, losses, or injustices to the self;
reflection represents a useful summary conception of self-attentiveness
motivated by intrinsic curiosity, or epistemic interest in the self. It is concluded that the spatial metaphor of "direction" may not be an appropriate basis for a useful scientific conception of dispositional self-consciousness. The concept of a purely cognitive tendency to have attention chronically directed toward the self versus away from the self, construed independently of the emotional and
motivational determinants of such a tendency, is probably untenable.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:BVAU.2429/6215 |
| Date | 05 1900 |
| Creators | Trapnell, Paul David |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Relation | UBC Retrospective Theses Digitization Project [http://www.library.ubc.ca/archives/retro_theses/] |
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