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Dědictví filosofického behaviorismu: pojem mysli bez myslí / The legacy of philosophical behaviourism: the concept of mind without minds

The epistemological problem of unity and its development in the philosophy of Bertrand Russell is the main subject of this essay. The first chapter is devoted to naïve realism developed by G. E. Moore and adopted by early Russell. I explain the notion of objective unity of proposition. The second chapter concerns Russell's departure from naïve realism and the multiple relation of judgment which Wittgenstein's criticism rendered as fatally unable to handle the problem of synthetic unity. The breakdown of this theory led Russell to naturalism, which is the topic of the last chapter. I pay special attention to the regressive argument proposed in slightly different versions by Moore, L. Wittgenstein and G. Ryle. Keywords realism, neutral monism, behaviorism, unity, consciousness

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:310411
Date January 2012
CreatorsSoutor, Milan
ContributorsKolman, Vojtěch, Hill, James
Source SetsCzech ETDs
LanguageCzech
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis
Rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess

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