Return to search

Relationship Between Chief Executive Officer Compensation, Duality, and Return on Equity

Poor decisions and conflicts of interest by members of company boards of directors have been a factor in the dramatic rise in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, resulting in a lower return on equity (ROE) for shareholders. The purpose of this correlational study was to examine the relationship between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size, as measured by total assets. Agency theory was the theoretical framework for this study. The study examined whether a statistically significant relationship existed between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE, after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. Archival data were collected and analyzed from a sample of publicly traded firms in the United States listed on the 2016 Standard & Poor's 500 Index. Hierarchical multiple regression techniques were used to test the relationship between variables. The results indicated that there was not a statistically significant relationship between CEO compensation, CEO duality, and ROE after controlling for CEO age, CEO tenure, and firm size. The study may contribute to positive social change by increasing the potential for board of directors' members to implement best practices, contributing to reduced shareholder conflicts, less litigation, higher ROE, and enhanced investor confidence benefiting emerging economies and local communities.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:waldenu.edu/oai:scholarworks.waldenu.edu:dissertations-7376
Date01 January 2018
CreatorsRescigno, Elizabeth
PublisherScholarWorks
Source SetsWalden University
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
Formatapplication/pdf
SourceWalden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies

Page generated in 0.0899 seconds