This dissertation investigates the status of reflection in Hegel's account of modern ethical life. I ask, on the one hand, why Hegel places so much significance on unreflective attitudes, and on the other, which forms of reflection remain compatible with what he calls the habit of the ethical. This question exposes crucial commitments underlying Hegel's project in the Philosophy of Right and interrogates the flexibility of his account and its openness to normative change. Yet my inquiry also has broader implications for the nature of social criticism. I argue that even reflection of the overtly critical variety emerges from and remains indebted to our habitual comportment and that this is why it must retain a valued place in ethical life.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:columbia.edu/oai:academiccommons.columbia.edu:10.7916/D8MG7WMX |
| Date | January 2012 |
| Creators | Novakovic, Andreja |
| Source Sets | Columbia University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Theses |
Page generated in 0.0016 seconds