Under the information inconsistency between the owners and the chief managers of the bank, in the first part, I am going to discuss the effect of a strategic variable to the bank in a monopolistic competition market, which is a linear combination used as a incentive schemes As giving the chief managers the strategic inducement contract according to the linear combination of profit, the amount of loan and bad debt. In the thesis, I prove that the best strategic inducement contract is the contract which is based on the bank profit alone. It encourages the chief managers to make the best out of their effort, and it ensures the goal of benefit maximization of the bank can be achieved. In the second part of the discussion, I assume the market consists of two different types of bank. One is the stable and conservative type of bank, which set the main goal to maximize the profit. The designate strategic inducement contract is only aim to reward those who achieve the bank profit. Another bank has the strategic inducement contract not taking the profit as its main goal, for as it may take the amount of loan as reference. In the latter part of thesis, proving that although the conservative old school type bank is not comparable to the aggressive new bank in the growth rate of loan and spread, the net profit is clearly outperform the new bank. This also implies that the control of credit risk is the key to the amount of the profit to be made and the success in competition.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0713106-150100 |
| Date | 13 July 2006 |
| Creators | Chen, Wei-Jen |
| Contributors | Tru-Gin Lau, Peter Lin, Shan-Non Chin |
| Publisher | NSYSU |
| Source Sets | NSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive |
| Language | Cholon |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0713106-150100 |
| Rights | unrestricted, Copyright information available at source archive |
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