The purpose of this paper discusses how to construct a strategic relationship among managers, accountant, and tax authority in order to reach the equilibrium, by using a formal model of corporate income tax evasion with concept of game theory. We also analyze when managers think over to raise the utility itself by tax evasion, how to determine the income report and how to collude with accountants by bribing them in order to evade taxes successfully. There are two parts of the model. The first part, we assume companies have only two possible real income values and reported income values; the second part, we assume the real income and the reported income of a company are between two values, which can be any values with in the uniform distribution. After analyzing, we find the result that if the government aggravates the penalty for tax evasion, managers of high real income companies will increase their desires to bribe and evade taxes. Although doing this way actually decreases the cases of bribery and tax evasion, but it works for general (non high real income) companies only. If the government does the opposite way, the result would be totally opposite as well; Managers of general real income companies increase their desires to bribe and evade taxes. Therefore, (the government) increasing the audit rate is the only effective way to decrease the cases of tax evasion and bribery.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:NSYSU/oai:NSYSU:etd-0817106-150604 |
| Date | 17 August 2006 |
| Creators | Kuo, Tai-ling |
| Contributors | Tru-Gin Liu, none, none |
| Publisher | NSYSU |
| Source Sets | NSYSU Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Archive |
| Language | Cholon |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | http://etd.lib.nsysu.edu.tw/ETD-db/ETD-search/view_etd?URN=etd-0817106-150604 |
| Rights | not_available, Copyright information available at source archive |
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