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Public Reasons, Comprehensive Reasons, and the Integrity Objection

In this paper, I defend Rawlsian Political Liberalism from the integrity objection. Integrity objectors claim that political liberals unjustifiably exclude certain religious citizens from making use of their religious values when voting upon basic principles of justice and constitutional essentials. I argue, first, that the integrity objection does not apply to political liberalism. Second, I claim that there is a place in the public, political culture for citizens to make use of their comprehensive values. Third, I argue that attempts to reformulate political liberalism to avoid the integrity objection are ultimately unsuccessful.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:GEORGIA/oai:scholarworks.gsu.edu:philosophy_theses-1157
Date12 August 2014
CreatorsHerman, Stephen
PublisherScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Source SetsGeorgia State University
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
Formatapplication/pdf
SourcePhilosophy Theses

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