Even though empirical studies show that political institutions affect various economic policies, standard economic models do not evaluate the effects of government ideology on the performance of state firms. I argue that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are more efficient under center-right governments, while state firms under center-left cabinets show weaker performance. A modified Stackelberg oligopoly competition model that analyzes the proposed connection is developed. I, then, test implications from the model empirically using the case of Lithuania.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:siu.edu/oai:opensiuc.lib.siu.edu:theses-2773 |
Date | 01 August 2015 |
Creators | Cepenas, Simonas |
Publisher | OpenSIUC |
Source Sets | Southern Illinois University Carbondale |
Detected Language | English |
Type | text |
Format | application/pdf |
Source | Theses |
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