This thesis is divided into two main parts. The first provides a novel analysis of dynamic optimal taxation under the assumption that individuals in an economy have ‘hidden’ idiosyncratic productivity levels. Specifically, it shows how to derive a complete set of optimality conditions characterising the solution to a problem of this kind. The method relies on constructing perturbations to the consumption-output allocations of agents in a manner that preserves all relevant incentive compatibility restrictions. We are able to use it to generalise the ‘inverse Euler condition’ to cases in which preferences are non-separable between consumption and labour supply, and to prove a number of novel results about optimal income and savings tax wedges. The second main part investigates a more general problem. When policymakers are constrained in their present choices by expectations of future outcomes a well-known time-inconsistency problem hinders optimal decision-making: the preferences of policymakers who exist at different points in time are not in agreement with one another, because of differences in the constraints faced by each. We present a new approach to determining policy in this setting, based on asking: What policy would be chosen by a decisionmaker who did not know the time period in which their choice was to be implemented? This is akin to designing institutions from behind a Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’. The theory is used to obtain qualitative policy prescriptions across a number of environments; these policies have several appealing properties that we outline.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:568087 |
| Date | January 2011 |
| Creators | Brendon, Charles Frederick |
| Contributors | Wren-Lewis, Simon |
| Publisher | University of Oxford |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:f4531e94-54bf-43f6-843f-5d37054476f1 |
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