Past empirical analysis show that in contrast to the theory predictions; prices tend to decline in some sequential auctions, a puzzle known as the declining price anomaly. Several theoretical explanations were proposed demonstrating the possibility of a declining price pattern under certain assumptions. In this paper, we demonstrate that when bidders have private values and multi-unit demand, expected selling price can be increasing, constant, decreasing or even non-monotonic. In our model, price pattern depends on the distributions from which bidder valuations are drawn (including the size of the bidders demand reduction), and the number of bidders.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CLAREMONT/oai:scholarship.claremont.edu:cmc_theses-2157 |
| Date | 01 January 2015 |
| Creators | Shi, Tongjia |
| Publisher | Scholarship @ Claremont |
| Source Sets | Claremont Colleges |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Source | CMC Senior Theses |
| Rights | © 2015 Tongjia Shi, default |
Page generated in 0.0159 seconds