Adult memory for verbatim and gist information was tested immediately and after a 12-day delay in three experiments within the framework of fuzzy-trace theory, (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 1990; Reyna & Brainerd, 1991) using a crossed, within-subjects false recognition design which controlled for the amount of verbatim and gist in recognition stimuli and for the difficulties mentioned by Fletcher (1992). Instruction to recognize gist or verbatim information was a between-subjects factor. Experiment 1 investigated sentence recognition and misrecognition of inferences for spatial and linear sentences. Subjects exhibited both verbatim memory for the presented premises and gist intrusion for sentences that differed in surface form but shared the same gist. Relationships between presented premises and their inferences were independent when subjects interrogated verbatim traces to answer memory questions, and gist traces to answer reasoning (inference) questions. Subjects used gist to verify sentences in the meaning condition, and dependencies between premises and inferences were largely positively dependent. Overall, Experiment 1 replicated Reyna and Kiernan's (in press) findings with children, suggesting that adults do not qualitatively differ from children in the processing of verbatim and gist representations. Experiment 1's results rule out a constructivist account of memory (e.g., Bransford and Franks, 1971). Experiment 2 investigated recognition of inflected (e.g., past tense and plural) verb and noun word pairs, and misrecognition of analogous pairs. Results were similar to Experiment 1 as subjects used verbatim traces for verification in the memory condition. When processing for patterns, however, some subjects appeared to use a phonological rule, whereas others appeared to use a semantic rule. Experiment 3 investigated recognition of interpretations of novel Literal and Perceptual metaphors. Results were largely similar to those of Experiments 1 and 2. However, negative dependencies were found between presented metaphors and their interpretations in the memory condition, supporting the principle of discrepancy detection (e.g., Loftus, 1979). Evidence disconfirmed stage models of metaphor interpretation in which literal precedes figurative interpretation. Results were explained by two models of interpretation depending on metaphor type (Literal or Perceptual). Individual differences in gist versus verbatim processing were found in adults across the three experiments.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:arizona.edu/oai:arizona.openrepository.com:10150/186487 |
| Date | January 1993 |
| Creators | Lim, Phyllis Louise |
| Contributors | Reyna, Valerie F., Brainerd, Charles, Aleamoni, Lawrence M., Cox, David E. |
| Publisher | The University of Arizona. |
| Source Sets | University of Arizona |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text, Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic) |
| Rights | Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. |
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