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Optimal management of a transboundary fishery with specific reference to the Pacific salmon

Managing a common property resource, especially one jointly owned by two nations, is a formidable problem as it involves both incentives to cooperate and incentives to cheat. Often conflicts flare up, followed by efforts of reconciliation, which are interrupted again by new conflicts. A classic example of this is the Pacific salmon fishery, which is jointly harvested by the U.S.A and Canada. To understand the nature of this conflict, and to make policy recommendations, a game-theoretic approach is developed in this thesis.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:QMM.20879
Date January 1998
CreatorsTian, Huilan, 1964-
ContributorsThomassin, Paul J. (advisor)
PublisherMcGill University
Source SetsLibrary and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeElectronic Thesis or Dissertation
Formatapplication/pdf
CoverageMaster of Science (Department of Agricultural Economics.)
RightsAll items in eScholarship@McGill are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated.
Relationalephsysno: 001610123, proquestno: MQ44298, Theses scanned by UMI/ProQuest.

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