In front of the White House press corps, George H. W. Bush stood with
Panamanian President Guillermo Endara and proclaimed âÂÂdemocracy has been
restored,â the âÂÂpeace is now preserved,â and âÂÂwe must see that prosperity returns to the
people of Panama.â True, democracy had been restored, but at a great price to the
Panamanians and without a plan for recovery.
The struggle to remove Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega began with Ronald
Reagan and ended in the first year of BushâÂÂs presidency. While sanctions decimated the
Panamanian economy, the military invasion left the country with inexperienced political
leaders and internal instability. Academics who have studied the Panamanian crisis
have not focused on the crucial twelve-month period between May 1989 and May 1990.
It was the first military action without Cold War priorities for the United States and first
attempt at economic restoration in what would become standard practice for later
administrations.
Scholars have not thoroughly examined the Bush administrationâÂÂs crisis with
Panama. The literature is scarce, but what has been written can be divided into three groups: disgruntled policy makers, academics, and journalists. Principally, this literature
investigates the December 1989 military invasion, and only a few scholarly articles and
books examine both the pre- and post-invasion periods. Lacking primary source
material, journalists and scholars relied on articles and participant interviews.
This thesis focuses on events and the outcome. It examines BushâÂÂs policy toward
Panama and the successes it engendered along with the failures it brought. Unlike
Reagan, Bush successfully removed Noriega from power, but his administrationâÂÂs
unsuccessful post-invasion planning hindered the needs of Panama during the
establishment of the young democratic government. Noriega may have decimated
PanamaâÂÂs economy, but the United States also failed by not helping with a clear and
concise objective after NoriegaâÂÂs departure. This thesis demonstrates that Bush acted
with prudence in 1989, invading Panama only when all other diplomatic options failed.
Yet, this thesis shows that the Bush administration did not have a plan for PanamaâÂÂs
economic restoration. By focusing too much energy on removing Noriega rather than on
helping Panama regain a solid economic foundation, Bush allowed his desire to help the
fledging country to be overshadowed by a lack of post-invasion plans.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:tamu.edu/oai:repository.tamu.edu:1969.1/4731 |
| Date | 25 April 2007 |
| Creators | Blanton, Troy Franklin |
| Contributors | Anderson, Terry |
| Publisher | Texas A&M University |
| Source Sets | Texas A and M University |
| Language | en_US |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Book, Thesis, Electronic Thesis, text |
| Format | 200905 bytes, electronic, application/pdf, born digital |
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