This thesis examines Derek Parfit's theory of personal identity. Parfit argues that what matters in the continued existence of persons through time is psychological connectedness and continuity (relation R), and that the identity relation does not matter. He makes this claim through a series of arguments which, he says, inevitably lead to the conclusions that relation R is the only relation that matters, in all cases. I argue that Parfit does not convincingly demonstrate that relation R is in fact all that matters. In examining each of Parfit's arguments, I show that it is possible to draw conclusions that are inconsistent with those drawn by him. I argue that this shows Parfit's position to be an arbitrary one. If Parfit's arguments do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that relation R is all that matters in questions of survival, then his theory is not an adequate solution to the problem of personal identity.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:QMM.59915 |
| Date | January 1991 |
| Creators | Newburg, Anne |
| Publisher | McGill University |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Coverage | Master of Arts (Department of Philosophy.) |
| Rights | All items in eScholarship@McGill are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated. |
| Relation | alephsysno: 001237442, proquestno: AAIMM67469, Theses scanned by UMI/ProQuest. |
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