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Accountability and financial oversight reform: the case of the Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO)

The Conservative Government came to power in 2006 on a platform of accountability.
One aspect of this platform was the creation of a Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO).
The PBO was intended to contribute to a higher level of accountability in government
budgeting. This thesis seeks to explain why the PBO was created, what it does, and
contemplates whether the PBO has been able to help Parliamentarians hold the
Executive to account. In addition, the thesis questions how the PBO itself is held
accountable. Finally the study considers potential changes to the PBO and what might
become of the PBO after its conspicuous first leader Kevin Page passes from the scene.
Minor changes to the PBO’s legislation and placement within the institutions of
government may improve the results of the PBO. However, the PBO’s effectiveness,
independence and accountability will still depend on the office’s structural
characteristics and leadership.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:MWU.1993/5279
Date09 April 2012
CreatorsMcKenzie, Daniel
ContributorsRounce, Andrea (Political Studies), Thomas, Paul (Political Studies) Simpson, Wayne (Economics) Levasseur, Karine (Political Studies)
Source SetsLibrary and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada
Detected LanguageEnglish

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