I analyze the effect of various risks faced by commercial banks on the executive compensation in banking industry. Commercial bank executives are risk averse due to the regulatory pressure in addition to board governance mechanism. Commercial banks face various risks because of the regulatory mechanism and unique asset structure of the firm. So, it is expected that they should associate their own pay and pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) with the risks their banks face.
I find that bank executives associate their performance based pay with both idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk. But they associate their fixed pay only with systematic risk. The risk based PPS is also affected by the idiosyncratic risk but not by the systematic risk. Both asset return risk and insolvency risk have significant positive effect on PPS.
Bank executives put significantly higher emphasis on the fixed compensation in terms of salary and bonus, and significantly lower emphasis on the performance based compensation. They also put minimum emphasis on the risk based PPS although they put significant emphasis on return based PPS. These indicate the risk-averse nature of the bank executives due to the regulatory pressure in addition to board governance mechanism.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uno.edu/oai:scholarworks.uno.edu:td-2731 |
| Date | 06 August 2013 |
| Creators | Safa, Mohammad Faisal As |
| Publisher | ScholarWorks@UNO |
| Source Sets | University of New Orleans |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations |
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