ABSTRACT
This research investigates the role played by external actors in contemporary African
civil conflicts with specific attention to South Africa’s leading role in addressing
Burundi’s intractable civil conflict. The inquiry was guided by looking at SA’s efforts
in managing Burundi’s peace process in partnership with key external parties such as
the Regional Initiative for peace in Burundi, AU and the UN; and by examining the
level of success of SA’s involvement in the peace process and limitations encountered
in pursuing diplomatic/political and military efforts aimed at resolving the civil
conflict. The theories of conflict resolution and protracted social change, and
scholarly and policy literature on intervention were drawn upon to frame the research.
The struggle for political power explains the key root cause to Burundi’s civil
conflict; rival politicians manipulated ethnicity and the past injustices, which are
rooted in colonial policies of divide and rule, as tools in an attempt to accede to power
and thereby, gain economic advantage at the expense of others. SA diplomatic efforts
played an important role in addressing this by advocating for political and military
power sharing.
In order to reconcile and manage differences in approaches that were advocated to deal with
the Burundi civil conflict, SA mobilized for support in Burundi’s neighbouring countries so
as to back a peaceful solution to address the conflict. Further, in an effort to bolster its
troops and, therefore, expand operations designed to promote peace in Burundi, SA
had to merge into the African Mission in Burundi, and cooperate with the UN in order
for the latter to render impetus to the peace process by, providing necessary resources
and political support for the Burundi peace mission, and subsequently to assume the
mission by taking over from the African mission.
Although SA’s troop deployment provided protection for the former Hutu exile
politicians and thereby, encouraged them to participate in negotiations and the
transitional government, which participation increased chances of success in the peace
process, however, SA did not do much in peacekeeping under the UN due to
inadequate military equipments; civilians continued to be killed in the presence of SA
troops, even though, under the UN their role extended to include civilian protection.
To the extent that SA’s intensive diplomatic efforts resulted in the Arusha Peace and
Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, however, a number of Burundian parties did
not participate in the signing of the agreement and the rebel movements were
excluded from the process. Thus, the Arusha peace process failed to attain consensus
in addressing Burundi’s contentious issues.
Although the UN peacekeepers in Burundi, of which SA was part, had a Chapter VII
mandate to enforce the peace of which civilian protection was part of their mission,
they did not exercise it. Intervention was constrained by the Burundian government;
they argued that the ultimate authority in maintaining security throughout the country
rested on them. Moreover, it is difficult if not impossible to observe UN traditional
peacekeeping norms while at the same time having to implement the responsibility to
protect, which has been occasioned by the post-Cold War world, in which human
rights have gained wider recognition, and international norms of sovereignty and nonintervention
redefined. Thus, strict observance of the UN traditional peacekeeping
norms, inhibit intervention aimed to protect civilians facing catastrophic
circumstances or under imminent threat.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:wits/oai:wiredspace.wits.ac.za:10539/4652 |
| Date | 12 March 2008 |
| Creators | Kiiza, Charles J. |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | 42527 bytes, 16466 bytes, 1180253 bytes, application/pdf, application/pdf, application/pdf, application/pdf, application/pdf, application/pdf |
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