'An Internalist Theory of Practical Reasons' is a qualified defense of Bernard Williams' claim that some motivational element, or 'desire' in the broadest sense, is a necessary condition of reasons for action. The dissertation has two main parts In the first part I narrow down Williams' internalist theory by giving it a specific interpretation, and by explaining how and why so many of his critics have misinterpreted it (this involves developing a twelve part classification of contemporary theories which fall under the rubric of 'internalism,' but which are logically independent of one another). I then identify and explicate Williams' two main arguments against externalism: that external reasons claims lack explanatory power, and that they violate the ought-implies-can principle. Before defending internalism against challenges by neo-Aristotelian and value-based accounts of practical reasons, I develop a more robust version of Williams' theory In the second part of the dissertation I begin by distinguishing internalist from instrumental theories of reasons. I then provisionally defend an instrumental theory by showing how, despite common objections, instrumentalists can provide a non-instrumental justification for adherence to principles that are constitutive of rationality, and are thus presupposed by the existence of reasons. Examples of such principles include the requirements that preference orderings be transitive and complete. Finally, I argue that internalists but not instrumentalists have the conceptual resources to acknowledge an important class of norm-based, non-teleological reasons which explain why many people contribute to the production of collective goods, even when the costs of contribution exceed the expected benefits. I conclude that internalism shares many of the theoretical virtues of instrumentalism, but that it lacks its principal vices / acase@tulane.edu
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TULANE/oai:http://digitallibrary.tulane.edu/:tulane_25644 |
| Date | January 2006 |
| Contributors | Anomaly, Jonathan (Author), Gaus, Gerald (Thesis advisor) |
| Publisher | Tulane University |
| Source Sets | Tulane University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Rights | Access requires a license to the Dissertations and Theses (ProQuest) database., Copyright is in accordance with U.S. Copyright law |
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