The purpose of this dissertation is to attempt to show that C. L. Stevenson has been largely successful in accomplishing what he set out to accomplish with his metaethical noncognitivism: mainly, (a) to clarify the meanings of some key ethical terms, and (b) to characterize the methods by which moral judgments are and can be supported. In particular, I wish to argue that the two fundamental (and definitive) doctrines of Stevenson's noncognitivism are correct. These two doctrines are that moral judgments generally do not function as descriptions of objects or states of affairs, and that moral judgments function to express, evoke, and/or alter attitudes toward the objects of our moral sentiments--and do so without necessarily altering beliefs about those objects. This is to say that moral judgments do not generally function as constatives, but rather have functions which are primarily illocutionary and perlocutionary. / In Chapter I, I discuss the nature of metaethical inquiry, and I argue that metaethics is substantially neutral with respect to normative ethics. This is important because in order to properly evaluate Stevenson's theory, we must understand that indeed his is a metaethical theory, and as such does not have "dire consequences" for morality--a criticism often directed toward Stevenson's theory. / Stevenson's theory is largely a theory about ethical language. It is natural to ask why philosophers are concerned with language about duty, goodness, right and wrong, etc., rather than right and wrong themselves. Chapter II deals with this question by way of outlining a general theory of semiotics. Insofar as metaethics is largely concerned with the meanings of moral judgments, it is important that the moral philosopher recognize that meaning is a function of all three dimensions of language: the pragmatical as well as the semantical and syntactical dimensions. Furthermore, if we are apprized of the conventional nature of language we can perhaps more fully appreciate Stevenson's theory of meaning than do some of his critics. / Chapter III is a reductio of sorts. Here I offer brief sketches of some traditional metaethical theories and indications of what I think are some major shortcomings of these theories. What these traditional theories all have in common is that they are "descriptivistic," i.e., they regard moral judgments as descriptions of either very special "moral facts" (intuitionism), empirical facts (naturalism), or transcendent facts (supernaturalism). The success of these theories depends upon their establishing the existence of a semantical basis for moral judgments--this, I believe, they have failed to do. / Chapters IV-VI are concerned with the particulars of Stevenson's theory and criticisms thereof. In Chapter IV, I am concerned with explicating Stevenson's conception of the nature of ethical disagreement. His theory that ethical disagreement is essentially a matter of divergent attitudes (as opposed to divergent beliefs), and his doctrine of intrinsic/extrinsic approval, well account for a large part of ethical argumentation, and do so with very modest ontological and epistemological assumptions. In Chapters V and VI the doctrine of emotive meaning is explicated and defended; I offer a criticism of Stevenson's application of truth-values to moral judgments; and the function of reason in ethics is examined. I try to show here that Stevenson's theory--contrary to widely held opinion--recognizes a greater role for reason to play in ethics than do most, if not all, competing theories. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 41-07, Section: A, page: 3144. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Florida State University, 1980.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:fsu.edu/oai:fsu.digital.flvc.org:fsu_74216 |
| Contributors | WALKER, DAVID EUGENE., Florida State University |
| Source Sets | Florida State University |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text |
| Format | 224 p. |
| Rights | On campus use only. |
| Relation | Dissertation Abstracts International |
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