How ought one to act? What is action? This dissertation is about how far an answer to the second question can take us towards an answer to the first. Many philosophers think that an answer to the metaphysical question about the nature of action can take us very far towards an answer to the ordinary question about how to act. There are two popular ways of developing this idea. According to neo-Kantianism, agency presupposes the capacity to engage in non-instrumental forms of practical thought. According to neo-Humeanism, agency is limited to the capacity to engage in instrumental thought. In this dissertation, I criticize each of these and offer a better alternative. With the neo-Humean and against the neo-Kantian, I argue that non-instrumental practical thought is not necessary for agency. And with the neo-Kantian but against the neo-Humean, I argue that non-instrumental practical thought is possible. Attempts to answer How ought one to act? by answering What is action? are attempts to explain how something ought to be through an account of what something is. Neo-Kantians and neo-Humeans focus on action because they think this: what practical reason requires of some agent it requires of all conceivable agents. Action seems to be the best place to look to ground norms with the relevant scope. However, in order to combine the insights of each-namely that non-instrumental practical thought is not necessary, though still possible-we have to give up on this conception of the scope of practical requirements. And if we do, we are left with the task of finding other features of ourselves, say, our humanity, to ground the robust standards of moral life.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:PITT/oai:PITTETD:etd-12072004-152920 |
| Date | 04 February 2005 |
| Creators | Lavin, Douglas |
| Contributors | John McDowell, Michael Thompson, Stephen Engstrom, Jennifer Whiting |
| Publisher | University of Pittsburgh |
| Source Sets | University of Pittsburgh |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | http://etd.library.pitt.edu/ETD/available/etd-12072004-152920/ |
| Rights | unrestricted, I hereby certify that, if appropriate, I have obtained and attached hereto a written permission statement from the owner(s) of each third party copyrighted matter to be included in my thesis, dissertation, or project report, allowing distribution as specified below. I certify that the version I submitted is the same as that approved by my advisory committee. I hereby grant to University of Pittsburgh or its agents the non-exclusive license to archive and make accessible, under the conditions specified below, my thesis, dissertation, or project report in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis, dissertation or project report. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis, dissertation, or project report. |
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