I explore and defend the distinction between an abstract concept and conceptions of that concept—different ways of explicating the
content of that concept. In particular, I investigate contested concepts: concepts for which there appear to be genuine, principled disputes about which of several competing conceptions is the correct one.
Although philosophers (e.g., John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin) and others often employ the concept/conception distinction, it has seldom been the subject of sustained philosophical inquiry. In particular, little attention has been paid to its consequences for philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. This is unfortunate, for if they are adequately to explain certain common and
important features of language and thought, theories of content must find a place for the concept/conception framework.
I begin with a presentation of some examples of contested concepts, and then offer four conditions that jointly specify contested concepts and articulate four desiderata for an account of contested concepts. Next, I assess work in
this area by W.B. Gallie, Christopher Peacocke, and James Higginbotham, and briefly consider the ramifications of the concept/conception framework for any general account of concepts. After presenting a hypothetical example of an
extended conceptual contest, surveying the features of such disputes, I argue
that the contested concept phenomenon is theoretically novel with respect to
theories of content, in the sense that it resists assimilation to similar, familiar phenomena (e.g., ambiguity, vagueness, or confusion). Finally, I develop a positive account of contested concepts, arguing that when we attend to the considerations that exert rational force in disputes over contested concepts, we see that the contents of such concepts are intimately connected
with the notion of reflective equilibrium. I close with a brief survey of some areas for future research and applications.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:PITT/oai:PITTETD:etd-11282007-104502 |
| Date | 23 January 2008 |
| Creators | Criley, Mark Edward |
| Contributors | Anil Gupta, George Sparling, Kenneth Manders, Mark Wilson |
| Publisher | University of Pittsburgh |
| Source Sets | University of Pittsburgh |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | http://etd.library.pitt.edu/ETD/available/etd-11282007-104502/ |
| Rights | unrestricted, I hereby certify that, if appropriate, I have obtained and attached hereto a written permission statement from the owner(s) of each third party copyrighted matter to be included in my thesis, dissertation, or project report, allowing distribution as specified below. I certify that the version I submitted is the same as that approved by my advisory committee. I hereby grant to University of Pittsburgh or its agents the non-exclusive license to archive and make accessible, under the conditions specified below, my thesis, dissertation, or project report in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis, dissertation or project report. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis, dissertation, or project report. |
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