The systematisation of deductive inference can yield an account of the structure of sentences (propositions, thoughts) involved in such inference. In mainstream contemporary analytic philosophy, the idea of logical form is linked, explicitly or implicitly, with the idea of such a systematisation. But this is not the only thing one might mean by logical form. An enquiry into the structures of thoughts can be motivated by considerations besides inferential behaviour. In this dissertation I sketch an alternative conception according to which the uncovering of the logical structure of discourse proceeds from no single principle but rather piecemeal, from region of discourse to region of discourse. On this conception, the availability of a syntactic characterisation of the valid inference patterns in which a judgment participates is not a necessary condition for the attribution to it of a certain logical form.
I argue that Freges revolutionary application of function-argument analysis to logic plays a central rôle in his equation of the categories in terms of which to ascribe structure to thoughts with the syntactic categories needed for the systematisation of inference. Though the application is plausible in the case of mathematics, I argue that function-argument analysis is ill suited to the analysis of predicative structure generally. As an illustration of this claim, following Michael Thompsons lead, I discuss natural-historical judgments, a type of generic judgment about living things. I walk through a series of formal-semantic proposals for generic sentences, arguing that each founders on its imposition of function-argument analysis on natural-historical judgments. The logical form of natural-historical judgments is not to be understood on the functional model; the categories deployed in their grasp are not explained by their use in codifying inference patterns.
I associate the view that the uncovering of logical form is a piecemeal, unprincipled affair with the later work of Wittgenstein. I bring out how Wittgensteins engagement in the Tractatus with Freges and Russells conceptions of logic paves the way for his later development of the notion of grammar in the Investigations, in order to show how the conception of form I advocate has a genuine claim to logicality.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:PITT/oai:PITTETD:etd-08042008-231645 |
| Date | 29 October 2008 |
| Creators | Campbell, Christopher Alan |
| Contributors | John McDowell, Sebastian Rödl, Stephen Engstrom, Michael Thompson, Anil Gupta |
| Publisher | University of Pittsburgh |
| Source Sets | University of Pittsburgh |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | http://etd.library.pitt.edu/ETD/available/etd-08042008-231645/ |
| Rights | unrestricted, I hereby certify that, if appropriate, I have obtained and attached hereto a written permission statement from the owner(s) of each third party copyrighted matter to be included in my thesis, dissertation, or project report, allowing distribution as specified below. I certify that the version I submitted is the same as that approved by my advisory committee. I hereby grant to University of Pittsburgh or its agents the non-exclusive license to archive and make accessible, under the conditions specified below, my thesis, dissertation, or project report in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis, dissertation or project report. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis, dissertation, or project report. |
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