<p> We should reject presentism as the most intuitive theory of time. Prima facie, presentism might seem intuitive due to our perception of time. However, if presentism accurately represents the metaphysics of time, then presentism entails some counter-intuitive results regarding events, truths about the past, and temporary intrinsics. I argue that presentists can only allow for the present to be instantaneous, and then only at the cost of losing events as ontological entities. I argue that an ersatz B-series of times is viable only at the cost of losing the special metaphysical status of the present. Finally, I argue that the claim that propositions are true simpliciter is inconsistent with the claim that propositions are not eternally true. Given these problems, we can see that presentism has some strongly counter-intuitive entailments.</p>
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:PROQUEST/oai:pqdtoai.proquest.com:1586526 |
| Date | 25 April 2015 |
| Creators | Weede, Christian C. |
| Publisher | California State University, Long Beach |
| Source Sets | ProQuest.com |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | thesis |
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