The author of this thesis is concerned with the cwrismo &d12;v (separate) status of nou&d4;v (Thought) in Aristotle's De Anima III.4--5 and Metaphysics Λ.6--9, and Hegel's answer to this a ,pori&d12; a (aporia) in his Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie. For Aristotle, nou&d4;v is a pure actuality ( 3 ,n 3&d12;rgei a ) and final cause that cannot directly influence the wide array of Nature's particular determinations. For Hegel, however, Aristotle's nou&d4;v is not purely actual, if actuality refers to a static and separate substance, but is a dynamic activity (Tatigkeit), in which nou&d4;v ' self-referential nature is extended to include the diverse determinations of the Scala Naturae. This absolute character of nou&d4;v ensures the interrelation of all thought-determinations, since these determinations are the manifestation of the ubiquitous activity of Denken's inner self-differentiation. Only by coalescing final and formal causality in Denken can Hegel claim to have overcome the Aristotelian a ,pori&d12; a of the cwrismo &d12;v of nou&d4;v .
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uottawa.ca/oai:ruor.uottawa.ca:10393/8664 |
| Date | January 1999 |
| Creators | Nyvlt, Mark J. |
| Contributors | Geraets, Theodore, |
| Publisher | University of Ottawa (Canada) |
| Source Sets | Université d’Ottawa |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | 124 p. |
Page generated in 0.002 seconds