The aim of this study is to investigate Rawls' theory of moral justification by placing his concept of "Goodness as Rationality" in the context of his overall account of justice and morality. More specifically, my purpose is to determine how far Rawls' account has been able to undermine the challenge of moral scepticism. Does Rawls' account give an effective reply to the question "why be moral?"? Has he succeeded in making good his claim that he has constructed a theory of justice that while remaining normative, is both descriptive and objective? Has he been able to show that moral judgments are among the kinds of judgments whose truth can be determined publicly by any rational observer who is acquainted with the facts? Conclusions. (1) Rawls' attempt to revise the traditional contract theory does not succeed. He is unable to provide a moral basis for the social contract doctrine because his interpretation of the original position cannot yield principles that are uniquely acceptable from the moral point of view. (2) Rawls' method of reflective equilibrium does not succeed in the context of a prescriptive justificatory theory of justice. The method is only effective to the extent to which Rawls' theory can be regarded as a purely descriptive-explanatory theory of justice. (3) The two principles of justice as fairness need not commend themselves to all reflective persons as correct and impartial principles of justice. In particular the principles are influenced by certain ideologies of contemporary liberalism. (4) Rawls' account of the 'good' suffers from an inadequate theoretical basis. His attempt to extend his thin theory to the full theory of the 'good' does not work for at least one important reason: an effective sense of justice (one of the fundamental virtues which rational members of a well-ordered society would desire in one another) cannot be derived from Rawls' original position. In view of the motivational assumptions in the original position, as well as Rawls' reliance on an economic theory of rationality, an effective distinction cannot be made between a morally good person and a person of good morals. One of the important lessons from the failure of Rawls' theory is that contemporary writers in ethics would be reminded once more about what is possible and what is not possible in ethics. The study also stresses the need for further investigation of the notion of rationality, in particular, how this concept applies to morality.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uottawa.ca/oai:ruor.uottawa.ca:10393/11046 |
| Date | January 1977 |
| Creators | Erumevba, Joseph Tunde. |
| Publisher | University of Ottawa (Canada) |
| Source Sets | Université d’Ottawa |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | 483 p. |
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