Though the attribution of concepts to animals is relatively commonplace in ethology and comparative psychology, a number of philosophers and scientists have argued against attributing concepts to animals on conceptual and pragmatic grounds. In this dissertation I defend the practice of attributing concepts to animals and I provide a framework for understanding what it means for an animal to have concepts. In particular, I argue that the attribution of concepts to animals is a perfectly acceptable practice in the study of animal cognition, and that the possession of concepts provides animals with the basic structures necessary for reason. / In order to defend the practice of attributing concepts to animals, I first extract a general notion of 'concept' from the four dominant approaches to the study of animal cognition: cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, ethology, and comparative psychology. Then I consider what makes it acceptable for scientists to attribute concepts to animals. I argue that scientists' attributions of concepts occur both instrumentally and epistemically, and whether or not the attributions are acceptable depends largely on the context of the attribution of the concept. I go on to consider objections to the attribution of concepts based on claims that content must be adequately determined in order to reasonably attribute concepts to animals. I argue that the degree to which content needs to be determined depends on the goals of the experimenter. / Finally I argue that the possession of concepts enables organisms to behave flexibly and that this flexible behavior should be thought of as rational.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/U0003488066 |
| Creators | Goodrich, Grant. |
| Publisher | Indiana University. |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
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