Come funziona la struttura interna istituzionale una performance di governo? In questo lavoro, ci si concentra sulla Cina moderna, cercando di spiegare i
meccanismi che possono indurre un governo autocratico di adottare politiche coerenti. / How does the internal institutional structure affect government performances in
autocracies? In this paper, we focus on modern China, trying to explain what the
mechanisms are that might induce an autocratic government to adopt congruent
policies. Although there is no party or electoral competition, the leader worries
deposition by coup d état by the selectorate and revolutionary threats from the
citizens. We build a three players political-agency model, with the leader being the
agency, the selectorate and the citizens being the principles. The effectiveness of
the selectorate and the existence of revolutionary threats are two factors determining
the outcomes. As the size of the selectorate and the willingness to revolt vary
dramatically across countries, different types of autocracies arise, with some being
kleptocraitc and some being accountable.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:DocTA/oai:tesionline.unicatt.it:10280/1649 |
| Date | 19 April 2012 |
| Creators | LI, YUAN |
| Contributors | BORDIGNON, MASSIMO, GILLI, MARIO |
| Publisher | Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, MILANO |
| Source Sets | Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore. DocTA |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Doctoral Thesis |
| Format | Adobe PDF |
| Rights | reserved |
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