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Institutions, Political Cycles and Corruption : Essays on Dynamic Political Economy of Government

This thesis consists of three essays in Political Economy: “China’s Political Business Cycle” uncovers the fact that the timing of China’s business cycle correlates to the timing of the Communist Party’s Congress and constructs a theory to explain the mechanism of the political business cycle. An empirical test of the theory derives a result consistent with the predictions of the theory. “A Theory of Dynastic Cycle” provides a politico-economic theory to explain the mechanism of the dynastic cycle, a repeating pattern in China’s theory. The core of the theory is the ruler’s trade-off between the political account and the economic account in choosing a successor. “A Politico-Economic Theory of Corruption in Non-Democracy” investigates the ruler’s incentive to have corrupt agents. The key point is that a corrupt agent has a bad reputation and is less likely to replace the incumbent ruler. The major implication is that unless there is fundamental institutional change, it is hard to eradicate corruption in non-democracy.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:su-83374
Date January 2012
CreatorsLi, Yinan
PublisherStockholms universitet, Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Stockholms universitet, Institutet för internationell ekonomi, Stockholm : Department of Economics, Stockholm Univeristy
Source SetsDiVA Archive at Upsalla University
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeDoctoral thesis, monograph, info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis, text
Formatapplication/pdf
Rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
RelationMonograph series / Institute for International Economic Studies, University of Stockholm, 0346-6892 ; 76

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