This doctoral dissertation deals with intergovernmental relations in Canada. It seeks to explain a pattern that the author has observed in the federal government's approach to its relations with the provincial and territorial governments. The pattern is characterized by a noticeable reluctance on the part of the federal government to assert its valid constitutional powers, even when the courts uphold the constitutionality of those powers. The dissertation hypothesizes that federal reticence stems from serious omissions in the constitution of Canada. Those omissions left Canada institutionally incomplete. They were a result of a major constitutional abeyance, in Michael Foley's terminology, having to do with the founders' ambivalent feelings about Canadian sovereignty and nationhood. Because of that abeyance and the particular constitutional exclusions that flowed from it, the federal government routinely backs away from a leadership role even when the issue in question appears to fall squarely within its jurisdiction. The author's theoretical framework, integrating historical institutionalism and the theory of constitutional abeyances, is tested by an analysis of the federal government stance on internal trade barriers, environmental policy, and the federal spending power. The theory was upheld in the first two cases but is not able, with the method and approach used in this dissertation, to satisfactorily explain the federal position on its spending power.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:CHENGCHI/U000NR67875 |
| Creators | DiGiacomo, Gordon. |
| Publisher | Carleton University (Canada). |
| Source Sets | National Chengchi University Libraries |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Rights | Copyright © nccu library on behalf of the copyright holders |
Page generated in 0.0494 seconds