This research examines the extent to which variations in economic inequality affect variations in political processes and governmental spending in society. In order to address this research problem, a general and parsimonious model is developed by examining data from three distinct political units of analysis: American cities; American states; and nations. Thus, the model attempts to determine in a comparative fashion the extent to which patterns of relationships may be said to persist at multiple levels of analysis. / The general theory underlying the analysis suggests that the degree of economic inequality is generally a product of the level of social and economic heterogeneity and development. The degree of economic inequality, operationalized as inequality of income and inequality of property, affects the level of political competition, the degree of electoral participation, and the extent to which a single party dominates elections, independently of factors which lead to economic inequality. Finally, the level of economic inequality and the consequent political processes exert direct influences on the level of government expenditures. / The empirical analysis employs three data sets to examine the theoretical model. The first consists of a set of 171 of the largest central cities of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the United States. The second consists of a set of the 50 American states. The third consists of a set of 67 developing and developed nations. Analysis of the model is based on bivariate and multivariate statistics. / The empirical analysis finds that few general patterns emerge from applying the model across units of analysis. The consistent patterns which exist can be summarized as follows: (1) Fairly consistent relationships emerge from a parsimonious model of the determinants of both income and property inequality; and (2) economic inequality, especially inequality of income, consistently decreases the level of participation across all units. There seems to be an additional tendency for income inequality to be more influential on political processes than is property inequality. Property inequality, however, seems to play a greater role in determining public expenditures than does income inequality. / The findings suggest that inequality affects competition and partisanship differently across units. Nevertheless, several additional findings are important. These findings can best be summarized by unit of analysis. / American cities - Income inequality reduces support for Democrat candidates, reduces competition, and reduces participation. Property inequality exhibits the same general pattern of relationships as does income inequality. Property inequality shows a much more pronounced tendency to reduce expenditures than does income inequality. / American states - Income inequality increases Democratic partisanship, reduces participation, and reduces competition. Property inequality has virtually no effect on Democratic partisanship, but reduces electoral participation, and increases competition. Both income and property inequality constitute strong forces increasing state expenditures. / Nations - Income inequality increases leftist partisan domination of elections, increases competition, and decreases participation. Property inequality increases leftist partisanship, decreases participation, and reduces competition. Income inequality consistently reduces expenditures and property inequality reduces expenditures for functions other than national defense. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 41-02, Section: A, page: 0788. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Florida State University, 1979.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:fsu.edu/oai:fsu.digital.flvc.org:fsu_74090 |
| Contributors | PORTNEY, KENT EDWARD., The Florida State University |
| Source Sets | Florida State University |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text |
| Format | 371 p. |
| Rights | On campus use only. |
| Relation | Dissertation Abstracts International |
Page generated in 0.0596 seconds