My dissertation is about the moral epistemology of a theory of injustice. The orthodox paradigm maintains that we require an ideal theory of a perfectly just society in order to justify the principles for dealing with injustice. In contrast, I show that a theory of injustice is not dependent on ideal theory and develop a pragmatic realist alternative by critically engaging with the work of Elizabeth Anderson. My approach is pragmatist in stressing the importance of testing our principles against actual experience of their practical consequences, but it is realist in holding that justification must take into account the unjust motivations and actions of other agents. Whether racial integration is an imperative of justice depends on the extent to which unjust opposition to it means that conflicting courses of action have a better chance of mitigating racial injustice.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:columbia.edu/oai:academiccommons.columbia.edu:10.7916/d8-4v5y-hd68 |
| Date | January 2019 |
| Creators | Landau, Aaron |
| Source Sets | Columbia University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Theses |
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