Becker's discrimination theory predicted that the discrimination by employers on competitive markets should cease to exist. However, in past decades, it was shown that discrimination on the labour market is a prevalent phenomenon. In this thesis I analyse what is the impact of agency problem on the theory of discrimination. I show that when an agent (in the thesis called 'agent employer') is deciding whether to employ or not to employ a worker, his motivation is different compared to principal's. The outcome of the analysis is such that under certain assumptions, the agent employer with non-zero taste for discrimination will always choose to discriminate.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:193309 |
Date | January 2014 |
Creators | Froňková, Pavlína |
Contributors | Stroukal, Dominik, Nikolovová, Pavla |
Publisher | Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze |
Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
Language | English |
Detected Language | English |
Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
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