Asymmetric prisoner release initiatives (APRI), such as Israel's trade of 1027 security prisoners for one soldier, differ in kind from diplomatic POW exchanges and remain both undertheorized and unexamined. Most explanations tend toward the psychological or sociological. My data-driven plausibility probe finds that regime (democratic) and conflict (counterinsurgency) type are likely background conditions for APRI. Cross-case comparison of four democracies (Israel, UK, US, Spain) uncovers specific commonalities. Prisoner Discourse (international law/norms; "terrorist" belligerents; "worthy" prisoner) dictates state negotiation posture; societal support for asymmetric exchange, and underlies counterinsurgency praxis. These practices, the "Democratic Counterinsurgency Complex", paradoxically lead to prolonged conflict; favor recourse to "counterinsurgency through capture", and consequently create a "prisoner marketplace" which makes kidnapping state personnel a viable insurgent tactic. But APRI is contingent; not all democracies executed an asymmetric exchange during counterinsurgency. An Historical Institutionalist, within-case study of Israel from 1978-2011, shows that Menachem Begin faced a critical juncture of energy insecurity, Egypt peace negotiations, and electoral pressures. Begin's APRI (76 prisoners/one soldier) was socially and politically contested in 1979. By 1988, Israeli APRI had hardened into path-dependent praxis, and "social fact" by 2011. Specific cross-case factors strongly linked to APRI are a "no negotiation with terrorists" stance; external safe haven for insurgents; and family access to leaders. Denying cross-border access to insurgents, and limiting family access to leaders is important. But without a diplomatic posture/negotiation structure which allows direct talks with belligerents, democratic regimes are unlikely to be successful in counterinsurgency, and also more likely to execute APRI. / Doctor of Philosophy / Asymmetric Prisoner Release Initiatives (APRI), such as Israel's trade of 1027 Palestinian prisoners for one soldier still mystify some observers. I have found that there are specific conditions which explain APRI: first, democracies engaged in counterinsurgency campaigns are most likely to execute APRI. Second, specific factors such as the Prisoner Discourse (international law/norms; "terrorist" belligerents; and state prisoners considered especially "worthy"); and democratic counterinsurgency practices lead states into a tactic where mass detention of prisoners becomes routine. This prisoner imbalance makes insurgent kidnapping of state personnel a viable tactic. The factors most strongly associated with APRI include third-country safe haven for insurgents; a "no negotiation with terrorists" policy; and family access to state leaders. An absence of these, results in a less likely recourse to asymmetric prisoner exchange. It appears that if a government controls for these factors it is more likely to conduct successful counterinsurgency and be less likely to require such uneven prisoner trades.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:VTETD/oai:vtechworks.lib.vt.edu:10919/112812 |
| Date | 15 June 2021 |
| Creators | Jasper, Marc William |
| Contributors | Public Administration/Public Affairs, Peters, Joel, Datz, Giselle, Robinson, Glenn Ryan, Ahram, Ariel I. |
| Publisher | Virginia Tech |
| Source Sets | Virginia Tech Theses and Dissertation |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Dissertation |
| Format | ETD, application/pdf, application/pdf, application/pdf, application/pdf, application/pdf |
| Rights | In Copyright, http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
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