In this thesis work we present CLIK, a new, automated, remote attack on the control logic of a programmable logic controller (PLC) in industrial control systems. The CLIK attack modifies the control logic running in a remote target PLC automatically to disrupt a physical process. We implement the CLIK attack on a real PLC. The attack is initiated by subverting the security measures that protect the control logic in a PLC. We found a critical (zero-day) vulnerability, which allows the attacker to overwrite password hash in the PLC during the authentication process. Next, CLIK retrieves and decompiles the original logic and injects a malicious logic into it and then, transfers the infected logic back to the PLC. To hide the infection, we propose a virtual PLC that engages the software the virtual PLC intercepts the request and then, responds with the original (uninfected) control logic to the software.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:uno.edu/oai:scholarworks.uno.edu:td-3660 |
| Date | 06 August 2018 |
| Creators | kalle, Sushma |
| Publisher | ScholarWorks@UNO |
| Source Sets | University of New Orleans |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | University of New Orleans Theses and Dissertations |
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