Philosophers of science have long realized that it is not possible to decide which scientific theory is true just by relying on their empirical adequacy. That theories should possess other virtues in order to be accepted by the scientific community is well understood. Nevertheless, empirical adequacy remained as having a privileged value among these virtues. In this thesis I argue that scientific theories are accepted or rejected on the bases of an evaluation of their degree of coherence. In such a coherentist understanding, empirical adequacy still plays some role. However, this is an egalitarian approach where observational reports have no special status. By means of case studies form history of science I provided reasons to think that this coherentist approach is better suited to understanding scientific change as a rational process.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:METU/oai:etd.lib.metu.edu.tr:http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12609409/index.pdf |
| Date | 01 February 2008 |
| Creators | Kamozut, Mehmet Cem |
| Contributors | Sayan, Erdinc |
| Publisher | METU |
| Source Sets | Middle East Technical Univ. |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Ph.D. Thesis |
| Format | text/pdf |
| Rights | To liberate the content for public access |
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