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Previous issue date: 2002-05-24 / The WTO established two rules concerning the international protection of the TRIPs - trade related intellectual property rights, which includes patents and copyrights. One of these rules is the non-discrimination, which has shown to be efficiency-enhancing in the context of trade tariff reductions. The other is the national-treatment commitment rule. We develop in this paper a simple framework to show that the extended version of this rule - which is nowadays being imposed to members - brings out a loss of economic efficiency and a reduction in the levels of protection of intellectual property rights worldwide. As a consequence, it tends to reduce the investments on Research and Development throughout the world. This exactly contradicts the objectives of the Agreement.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:IBICT/oai:bibliotecadigital.fgv.br:10438/176 |
| Date | 24 May 2002 |
| Creators | Morais, Rafael Pinho Senra de |
| Contributors | Escolas::EPGE, FGV, Flôres Junior, Renato Galvão |
| Source Sets | IBICT Brazilian ETDs |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion, info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Source | reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, instname:Fundação Getulio Vargas, instacron:FGV |
| Rights | Todo cuidado foi dispensado para respeitar os direitos autorais deste trabalho. Entretanto, caso esta obra aqui depositada seja protegida por direitos autorais externos a esta instituição, contamos com a compreensão do autor e solicitamos que o mesmo faça contato através do Fale Conosco para que possamos tomar as providências cabíveis, info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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