<p> The thesis that perceptual experience is transparent has received considerable air-time in contemporary philosophy of mind and perception. Debate over its truth-value has reached an impasse. I diagnose this mired debate, and pursue a reformulation of the “transparency thesis” such that it can be more readily evaluated form the perspective of perceptual psychology and related subdisciplines. I argue that the empirical methods characteristic of these disciplines are important for evaluating the transparency thesis. Both historical and contemporary empirical results but substantial pressure on the transparency thesis.</p>
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:PROQUEST/oai:pqdtoai.proquest.com:10147308 |
| Date | 20 October 2016 |
| Creators | Bollhagen, Andrew |
| Publisher | California State University, Long Beach |
| Source Sets | ProQuest.com |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | thesis |
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