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Strategic signaling or emotional sanctioning? An experimental study of ex post communication in a repeated public goods game

Several experimental studies show that ex post communication mitigates opportunistic behavior
in social dilemmas. The source of this effect, especially in a repeated interaction, is nonetheless still obscure. This study provides a novel empirical testbed for two channels by which ex post communication may affect behavior in a repeated public goods game. One is related to strategic signaling. The other involves emotions induced by others' expressed disapproval. The presence of ex post communication strongly fosters pro-social behavior. The data
do not support the signaling hypothesis, favouring the emotion-based explanation instead. (author's abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:VIENNA/oai:epub.wu-wien.ac.at:4075
Date01 1900
CreatorsZylbersztejn, Adam
PublisherWU Vienna University of Economics and Business
Source SetsWirtschaftsuniversität Wien
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypePaper, NonPeerReviewed
Formatapplication/pdf
Relationhttp://www.wu.ac.at/economics/forschung/wp, http://epub.wu.ac.at/4075/

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