The aim of this thesis attempts to analyse two concepts connected with public procurement overpricing, competition effect and non-transparent effect. Dataset consists of 326 public procurement contracts. Existence of competition effect is proved, thus increase of competitors in selection procedure causes that final price decreases. Open types of selection procedures are also cheaper for public authorities. Analysis of non-transparent effect lies in possibility to find beneficial owner of each winner of selection procedure from public sources. Results show that companies with clear and visible owners realize public contracts cheaper than their non-transparent competitors. Findings are also discussed in public policy approach.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:324161 |
| Date | January 2013 |
| Creators | Stehlík, Petr |
| Contributors | Ochrana, František, Witz, Petr |
| Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
| Language | Czech |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
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