This dissertation investigates the role of public support for R&D in product innovation. In particular, I consider the role of matching grant programs and develop a theoretical model to analyze optimal private and public choices in a game-theoretic framework. This research develops-theoretical models to examine welfare implications of various policies that promote R&D. The first chapter of my dissertation develops a theoretical model of product innovation where R&D effort is endogenous and its outcome uncertain. The government attempts to aid such efforts with a matching grant. I consider different scenarios depending on whether two parties act simultaneously, act sequentially, or take part in a dynamic cooperative game with a trigger strategy. I also consider the case when the products are exported and when they are not. I analyze situations when government intervention increases the chances of product innovation and when it does not. The second chapter introduces foreign competition in a goods market, and analyzes the effects of foreign competition on domestic private and public incentives to product innovate. Government uses matching grant programs to aid private attempts to develop new goods. The government also tries to protect the domestic firm by imposing import tariff. Two policies are then considered simultaneously to investigate the effect of trade liberalization on product innovation. The third chapter considers technological partnerships between private and public sectors as R&D promoting policy. I assume increasing returns in R&D, and study whether government should support product innovation by helping with fixed costs or variable costs associated with product R&D.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:siu.edu/oai:opensiuc.lib.siu.edu:dissertations-2004 |
| Date | 01 May 2015 |
| Creators | Buryi, Pavlo |
| Publisher | OpenSIUC |
| Source Sets | Southern Illinois University Carbondale |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | Dissertations |
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