No one worked harder on his own image than Bernard
Montgomery, but he is rightly ranked among the most notable
British Second World War commanders. Less well-known is
Richard O'Connor, largely because of his own disregard
for publicity. They were two very different types of
personality. Both, however, demonstrated command skills
and operational strategic insights which enabled them to
compensate for the British Army's shortcomings in armour
in 1940. They were able to use what they had - simple
motorization - and adapt it away from stereotyped concepts
of logistical employment, which they replaced with
beneficial operational strategic utilization; Montgomery
during the Flanders Campaign (1940) and O'Connor in his
Libyan Campaign (1940-41). The two cases indicate that
advantage in warfare does not merely rely on numbers or
on superior or inferior armaments. It may have to rely
as much - if not more - on the personalities of the
commanders. / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:netd.ac.za/oai:union.ndltd.org:unisa/oai:umkn-dsp01.int.unisa.ac.za:10500/957 |
| Date | 01 January 2002 |
| Creators | Forrester, Charles James |
| Contributors | Fourie, Deon Francois Schonland |
| Source Sets | South African National ETD Portal |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Dissertation |
| Format | 1 online resource (vii, 129 leaves) : illustrations |
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