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Finitely Iterated Rational Secret Sharing With Private Information

This thesis considers the problem of finitely iterated rational secret sharing. We
describe how to evaluate this problem using game theory and finitely iterated prisoner’s
dilemma. The players each have a private horizon that the other player does
not know. The only thing that a player knows about their opponent’s private horizon
is a common upper bound. The description of a synchronous and asynchronous
finitely iterated secret sharing protocol with private information is followed by a game
theoretic proof of the viability of such protocols. / Graduate

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:uvic.ca/oai:dspace.library.uvic.ca:1828/5844
Date06 January 2015
CreatorsFoster, Chelsey
ContributorsKapron, Bruce
Source SetsUniversity of Victoria
LanguageEnglish, English
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeThesis
RightsAvailable to the World Wide Web, http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/

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