This thesis explores the role of the concept of equality in John Rawls' theory of justice. Rawls argues that the Kantian idea of the moral equality of persons translates into a primary principle of equal basic liberties, followed by a principle of fair equality of opportunity that addresses the moral arbitrariness of social and natural contingencies. Furthermore, the "difference principle" specifies that social and economic inequalities are only justified if they benefit the worst-off group. Libertarian critics such as Robert Nozick argue that Rawls' "difference principle" is inconsistent with a Kantian respect for the moral equality of persons as ends in themselves. Communitarians such as Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor argue that Rawls' egalitarian commitments are not supportable via a Kantian conception of the moral subject of justice as an autonomous pre-social self. This thesis defends Rawls' theory of justice against these challenges.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:QMM.79961 |
| Date | January 2003 |
| Creators | Liotti, Maria Cecilia |
| Contributors | Lu, Catherine (advisor) |
| Publisher | McGill University |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Coverage | Master of Arts (Department of Political Science.) |
| Rights | All items in eScholarship@McGill are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated. |
| Relation | alephsysno: 002084258, proquestno: AAIMQ98461, Theses scanned by UMI/ProQuest. |
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